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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented by these appeals are as 
follows. 
I 
The trial court abused its discretion in 
granting summary judgement. 
II 
Respondent is not entitled to summary judge-
ment in light of the issues raised by appellants. 
Ill 
Appellant filed sv/orn to documents and memorandums 
in opposition to respondent motions thereby raising 
genuine issues of material facts. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide 
this Appeal pursuant to Rule 3 (a) of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals and Utah Code Annotated Section 78-a-3 
(2) (j). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
These Appeals are from Summary Judgments entered by the 
Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County, State 
of Utah, in consolidated cases numbered 9299, 9478, 9934, 
9489, 10040, 10141, 10597, and 10782, dismissing Appellants 
claims against Respondent, First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. 
The Summary Judgments from which this appeal is taken 
were rendered on July 4, 1988, and entered by the Court on 
July 8, 1988. There were no Motions filed pursuant to 
Rules 50 (a) or (b), 52 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. A Motion under Rule 59 was filed and demied. The 
Notices of Appeal were filed on or about August 8, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
These appellants are appealing orders of Summary 
Judgment from the Fifth District Court dismissing most of 
appellants1 affirmative claims. At times throughout the 
pleadings, appellants are referred to as claimants. Also, 
on occassion, First Security Bank is referred to as FSB 
and Auto West, Inc., is referred to as AW. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I 
The trial court abused its discretion in granting 
summary judgment. 
Rule 56 (c) URCP allows summary judgment only if 
the sworn documents eleminate all genuine issues of 
material fact. The Trial Court failed to consider all 
of the pleadings and all of the depositions. Therefore, 
the orders of summary judgment were inappropriate. 
II 
Respondent is not entitled to summary judgment in 
light of the issues raised by appellants. 
One of the underlying principles of the Agthangelides 
(infra) case is that summary judgment should not be granted 
when a properly pled claim or defense, if proven at trial, 
will defeat plaintiff's claim, Eventhough appellants do 
not rest on their pleadings, summary judgment should not 
be allowed because of the claims and defenses pled by 
claimants, i.e., lack of consideration, lack of good faith 
dealings and fraud. 
Ill 
Appellant filed sworn to documents and memorandums 
in opposition to respondent motions thereby raising 
genuine issues of material facts. 
The supporting affidavits filed by plaintiff failed 
to meet the criteria of rule 56 (e) URCP and therefore, 
it was error for the trial court to consider the same. 
Further, the appellants filed numerous sworn to documents 
which raise genuine issues of material fact. 
Vr/I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The three (3) individual appellants, Paul D. Graf, 
Norman T. Stephens and Chas. E. Bryan are respectively the 
President, Vice President and Secretary of the Utah Land 
and Cattle Company, Inc., Three Peaks Water Company, Real 
West, Inc., Auto West, Inc., and Jones Motor Company Inc., 
Utah Corporations. They are also stockholders in all the 
above named corporations. (Depo., Chas. E. Bryan, civil 
#9299, taken 1&2 July, 1982 pp. 4-8). 
First Security Bank is a National Banking Corpora-
tion doing business in Cedar City, Utah. On or about 
March 27, 1979, in Cedar City, Utah, (complaint, civil 
#9299, p.l.f 11 1-3) the appellants and respondent, through 
their officers, negotiated a loan, the terms of which are 
as follows: (Depo., Chas. E. Bryan, civil #s 9299 & 10597, 
taken April 29 & 30, 1986, p. 195, 1. 16 thru p. 199, 
1. 10) 
(a) First Security Bank agreed to loan Appellants 
$300,000.00. 
(b) First Security Bank agreed to issue said &300,000.00 
to Auto West, Inc., upon request or on or before 
December 31, 1979. 
(c) First Securtiy Bank and appellants agreed that 
the interest rate upon said loan would be 14% 
per annum. 
(d) First Security Bank and appellants agreed that 
the term of said loan would be 15 years. 
(e) Appellants agreed to grant First Security Bank, 
as security for said loan, a second trust deed on 
the real property belonging to Jones Motor Company 
and all furniture fixtures and equipment not other-
wise encumbered. 
During December of 1979, appellants requested First 
Security Bank to issue said loan and proceeds, and First 
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Security Bank failed to issue the loan or distribute the 
proceeds therefrom. During January of 198 0, appellants 
requested the First Security Bank to issue said loan and 
proceeds, and Defendant failed to do so. (Depo., Chas. E. 
Bryan, civil #s 9299 & 10597, taken April 29 & 30, 1986, 
p. 197, 1. 16 thru p. 198, 1. 2). 
Most of the proceeds received by Auto West, Inc., 
Real West, Inc., Utah Land and Cattle Co., Norman Stephens, 
Chas E. Bryan and Paul D. Graff, as a result of the short 
term loans referred to herein, were in turn funnelled by 
said individuals and entities, with the suggestion, 
knowledge and approval of officers of First Security Bank 
to Auto West, Inc. ( Depo., Norman T. Stephens, civil 
$9299 and consolidated cases, taken December 1, 1986, p. 
118, line 15 thru p. 119, 1. 22). 
During February of 1980, officers of First Security 
Bank reaffirmed First Security Bank's commitment to loan 
appellants $300,000.00 on the same terms as stated above. 
Further appellants agreed to increase the principle amount 
of said loan sufficient to pay the interest on short term 
loans previously granted to Auto West, Inc., Real West, 
Inc., Utah Land and Cattle Co., Norman Stephens, Chas. E. 
Bryan and Paul D. Graff. 
Appellants relied upon the loan commitments of the 
Bank and in reliance thereon, appellants incurred debts. 
(Depo., Chas. E. Bryan, civil #s 10782 & 7528, April 16 
and 17, pp. 199 1. 6 thru p. 200, 1. 5 and Depo. Chas. E. 
Bryan, civil # 9478, pp. 16, 11. 5 thru p. 2, March 30. 
In September of 1980, an officer of First Security 
Bank requested Auto West, Inc., Real West, Inc., Utah Land 
and Cattle Co., Norman Stephens, Chas. E. Bryan and Paul D. 
Graf to bring the interest payment on all of their loans 
current as a condition for loaning Auto West, Inc., said 
..$300,000.00. Said officer of First Security Bank assured 
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appellants, that the $300,000.00 loan would be made as soon 
as said parties paid the interest current on their loans. 
Said parties complied and paid the interest current on all 
of their loans from First Security Bank. First Security 
Bank failed to make said loan. (See complaint in civil 
#10597, and Depo. June 12 & 13, 1987, pp. 31, 11. 19 thru 
p. 32, 1.1.) . 
On or about October 1, 1980, First Security Bank 
reconfirmed its commitment to loan appellants $300,000.00 
plus interest accured upon the short term loans, First 
Security Bank had make to Real West, Inc., Utah Land and 
Cattle Co., Norman Stephens, Chas. E. Bryan and Paul D. 
Graff, and that loan would be make during October of 1980. 
First Security Bank failed to make said loan to Auto West, 
Inc..(See complaint and Depo., supra.) Those terms were 
modified in April of 1981. (Depo. Chas. E. Bryan, civil 
#9299, pp. 198, 11. 9 thru p. 202, 1. 5). 
Auto West, Inc., acquired all of the Jones Motor 
Company stock in December of 1979. (Depo., Chas. E. Bryan, 
civil #s 10782 & 7528, 16 & 17 April, 1986, pp. 94 1. 
19 thru p. 98, 1. 16). 
During February of 1981, First Security Bank, through 
its officers, renewed its commitment to loan Auto West, 
Inc., $300,000.00 plus an additional sum of $22,000.00 
(an interest payment previously paid to First Security Bank 
by Real West, Inc.) and additional monies sufficient to pay 
current the interest on loans make by First Security Bank 
to Real West, Inc., Utah Land and Cattle Co., Norman Stephens, 
Chas. E. Bryan and Paul D. Graff. It was agreed by First 
Security Bank and Auto West that said loan would be secured 
as set forth above. First Security Bank agreed to make 
said loan in thirty (30) days. First Security Bank failed 
to do so. (See complaint and Depo., supra). 
< 
Appellants relied upon said loan commitment of First 
Security Bank and made expenditures in anticipation therof. 
(Depo., Cas. E. Bryan, civil #s 10782 & 7528, April 16 & 17 
1986, pp. 41, 1. 25.). 
On or about April, 1981, an officer of First Security 
Bank presented the Secretary/Treasurer of Auto West, Inc., 
with a document titled: "Schedule A - Purpose of Loan 
Proceeds" which did not provide Auto West, Inc., with the 
$300,000.00 previously committed by First Security Bank. 
During June of 1981, appellants and officers of First 
Security Bank met, where officers of First Security Bank 
advised appelants that First Security Bank was prepared to 
make a loan of $500,000.00, but most of the proceeds were 
to go to First Security Bank. First Security Bank officers 
also demanded, as security for said loan, all assets pre-
viously pledged to First Security Bank by all the appellants 
and all remaining assets of appellants. This offer and 
demand, was contrary to any previous loan commitment of 
First Security Bank. (See three citations immediately 
above). 
From August 1978 through February 1982, Appellants 
and First Security Bank had contracted, one with the other, 
in a floor plan financing agreement, to wit: First Security 
Bank provided the financing for appellants1 automobile 
inventory and purchased appellants customer installment 
sales contracts, either on 90 day or full recourse. (Depo., 
Chas. E. Bryan, supra, pp. 3L). Each time First Security 
Bank purchased a trust receipt for newly acquired inven-
tory from appellants, a fixed interest rate was established 
at the current prime rate plus 3/4 of a percent. However, 
as interest rates moved up, First Security Bank charged and 
collected an increased interest rate from appellants. 
(Depo., Chas. E. Bryan, civil #s 9299 & 10597). 
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First Security Bank also charged to and collected interest 
from appellants that was not earned or due. (Depo., Chas. 
E. Bryan, supra, pp. 150, 1. 5 thru p. 152, 1. 22). 
On or about August 24, 1981, Auto West, Inc. and 
Jones Motor Company jointly filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
with the U.S. District Court for Utah. (p.2, memorandum 
decision and order, United States District Court of Utah, 
Dated October 14, 1984, attached to claimants1 second 
memorandum in opposition to First Securityfs motion for 
summary judgment, dated April 1, 1988). 
After Auto West, Inc. and Jones Motor Company filed 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, First Security Bank, through its 
agents, repossessed automobiles sold by Auto West, Inc., 
failed to offer said vehicles to Auto West, Inc., sold said 
vehicles and charged Auto West, Inc. with deficiencies, all 
of which is contrary to the recourse agreements between 
these parties and said actions by First Security Bank 
constitute lack of good faith and breach of said recourse 
agreements. (Depo., Chas. E. Bryan, supra, pp. 167, 1. 24 
thru p. 172, 1. 9). 
Prior to September 1, 1981, First Security Bank 
conducted periodic, on premises, audits of the inventory of 
Auto West, Inc. Said audits were infrequent and never 
more than once monthly. Commencing on or about September 1, 
1981, and continuing through February 1982, First Security 
Bank conducted daily or twice daily, on premises, audits of 
Auto Westfs inventory. (Depo., Chas. E. Bryan, Supra, pp. 
182, 1. 6 thru p. 18). 
Based upon the aforedescribed discussion and 
agreement between the parties on March 30, 1979, Utah 
Land and Cattle Company, Inc., by and through Paul D. Graff 
and Chas. E. Bryan, executed and delivered to First Security 
Bank a Trust Deed Note (Second Trust Deed Note) in the 
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original principal amount of $127,000.00. On the same day, 
and to secure the performance of the obligations set forth 
in the Second ULC Note, Utah Land and Cattle, as trustor, 
executed and delivered to First Security, as beneficiary, 
a Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents. The Trust Deed 
Describes real property located immediately east of Cedar 
City in Iron County, Utah. (Depo., Chas. E. Bryan, civil 
#9299, August 26, 1983, p. 77, 11. 5-12). 
On March 30, 1981, Utah Land and Cattle, Three 
Peaks, Paul D. Graff, Chas,. E. Bryan, and Norman Stephens, 
pursuant to the aforesaid discussions and agreements between 
the parties, executed and delivered to First Security a 
Trust Deed Note in the original principal amount of 
$22,000.00 (the Third ULC Note). On the same day, and to 
secure the performance of the obligations set forth in the 
Third ULC Note, Utah Land and Cattle, as trustor, executed 
and delivered to First Security, as beneficiary, a Trust 
Deed with Assignment of Rents. The Trust Deed describes the 
same real property as described in the Trust Deed securing 
the First ULC Note. (Depo., Chas. E. Bryan, supra, p. 77 
11. 17-20). To secure the performance of the obligations 
set forth in the Third ULC Note, Three Peaks as trustor 
executed and delivered to First Security, as beneficiary, 
a Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents. (Depo., Chas. E. 
Bryan, supra, p. 77, 11. 21-22). 
On October 2, 1981, First Security Bank instituted 
its action for the judicial foreclosure of the Deeds of 
Trust described above, as well as Deed of Trust from Utah 
Land and Cattle Company and a Deed of Trust from Three Peaks 
Water Company, both of which describe water rights and bear 
the date of August 21, 1978. ( See Complaint). 
On February 8, 1982, the Appellants Utah Land and 
i 
CdLi it' a : . i i : ' M - r •
 t , j i \ < •-1 i a i i • . 11 (• L t J a i m a q a i i i s i 
First Security* 
Based upon assurances from oLiicers 01 i.arsi 
Security Bank that i lie debt., evidenced by i'lust Deca aa i od 
February "' •-.-n, • i j)C paid and retired form the 
proceeds ul lonq-Loun I inanclnq by llr< bank to Aula) West, 
Inc., Norman T. Stephens qranted a second Trust Need on 1 is 
home and Trust Deed Note (principle sum of $28,on->.na to 
First Security Ban!' . (Depo., Norman , fltepliens, civil 
#9299 and cons] a ted cases, • . '» • ] : ;.,*•-!, " 
December '•' ^ . ; do payments woto nadt] on the nolo. 
On Liu- 2/tb day of October, 1982, Security Title 
Company of Southern Utah, as trustee, recorded a NOTICE OV 
DEFAULT Aidi +he Iron County Recorder's Office pertainjnc to 
said 2nd Trust Deed. (See Exhibits attached lo Complaint). 
On or about Auqusl : n7 *, "h - Rryan at the 
suggestion of officers of First Security Rank, (stio 
second following refferal), executed and Jctivered to 
First Secuiity a Tiust Deed Note (Not* . he original 
principal sum of .^l^,;'. • * *>. (Depo., Fxhibil lj I , -'hi . ! . 
Bryan, civil '* (M.(; taken April :. I'i'ilJ. Prior thereto, 
officers of the bank represented to Chas. ! . Rryan Lhal 
payment of the note was to come 1rom the proceeds of the 
promised long term financing lo An: \ s:. (Depo., Chas. 
E. Rryan, civi 1 if l)4 /'J) . 
ALso on or about Auqusl I ' '» . M. , Iias. • . Rryai , 
as trustor, executed a\u\ delivered to First Security, as 
beneficiary, a Trust Deed w H h Assignment r<[ Rents ("Trust 
Deed " ) , (b" p< . , Fxh ib.il I! }, , ('has. !.. • - \ ..\, ^ivii - "• \' 
Taken March a), MirliJ;. viic Trust Deed created a second! lion 
interest in iavor of First Security on certain undeveloped 
real property <d Mr * Rryan, which was located In Iron 
County, Utah. 
<? 
At the time of the Note and Trust Deed, First 
Security Bank had a September 1, 1977 appraisal which had 
been previously prepared on the property by Ken Esplin. 
According to that 1977 appraisal, the property had a then 
fair market value of $79,000.00. (Depo., Exhibit #4, Chas. 
E. Bryan, civil # 9478, taken March 30, 1987). 
On or about October 6, L980, First Security Bank and 
Mr. Bryan signed a Modification Agreement which extended the 
maturity date of the Note to August 1, 1CM1. (Depo., Exhibit 
#4, supra). 
After the Note, as extended, had matured, First 
Security Bank requested the trustee of the Trust Deed to 
commence non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. Shortly 
before the scheduled foreclosure sale, First Security Bank 
requested and obtained a new appraisal from Lyman Munford on 
the property described in the Trust Deed. In his appraisal 
Mr. Munford concluded that the fair market value of the 
subject property as of year-end was $42,500.00. (Depo., 
Chas. E. Bryan, civil #9478, pp. 70, 11 12 thru p. 79). 
A non-judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed 
occurred on January 12, 1982. First Security Bank was the 
high bidder at the sale and acquired a trustee's deed to 
that property as a result of the foreclosure sale*. (See 
Exhibit attached to Complaint). Although the Trust Deed 
was the second lien on the property th it Trust Deed was the 
only First Security Bank lien which was foreclosed at the 
1982 trusteefs sale. With the excepti a of First Security, 
any other bidder who might have appeared at the sale would 
have purchased the subject property subject to First Security 
Bank's earlier 1977 trust deed. (See two citations immed-
iately above). First Security Bank bid in the sum of 
$16,695.20 at the foreclosure sale. (Depo., Chas. E. Bryan 
civil, #9478, March 30, 1987 pp. 78 1. 22 thru p. 79 1. 7). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Till-- i i\ i / w , l u u K {'• J\1'AI;>\',\J 1 1 J u i b C R i : ; T I ( )N I U CJKJMAT I I J' . 
P i : ;S[ - . )N , ) I : K " M , , f ' I r^:" ••:-• 'MJMMAir' . j m c i M U N T . 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides, in part, as fo 1 ] ows: 
The motion shall be served at least ten days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing 
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moviilg party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law, (Emphasis added) 
in the first paragraph of the Court's MEMORANDUM 
DECISION he states; 
This court has tried to read carefully all of the 
memorandums filed together with most of the 
pleadings and some of the depositions. (Emphasis 
added) 
By Lhe Court's own admission ho did no I read all of 
the plead Lugs and depositions. Without;, reading all of the 
pleadings and depositions I he Court could r 4 possibly fi id, 
as lie* did, U.it no genuine issue of material fact existed 
nor did the Com. t have a basis for finding I hat the 
respondeiii was entitled to judgment as a mailer ol law. 
• the case of Reliable Furniture Company vs. 
Fidelity, i6 Utah 2nd 211, 398 p. 2d 685 (Utah 1965), 
where the Coutl, (without i motion), nt pretrial dismissed 
plaintiffTs complaint, the Utah Supreme Com * , .n a lour 
to one decision, reversed the trial court saying: 
The summary disposal of a case serves a salutary 
purpose in avoiding the time, trouble and expense of 
a trial when it is justified. Hut unless it is 
/ / 
clearly so, there are other evils to be guarded 
against. A party with a legitimate cause, but who 
is unable to afford an appeal, may be turned away 
without his day in court; or, when an appeal is 
taken, if a reversal results and a trial is ordered, 
the time, trouble and expense is increased rather 
than diminished. It is to avoid these evils and to 
safeguard the right of access to the courts for the 
endorcement of rights and the remedy of wrongs by a 
trial, and by a jury if desired, that it is of such 
importance that the court should take care to see 
that the party adversely affected has a fair-
opportunity to present his contentions against 
precipitate action which will deprive him of the 
privilege. His contentions as to the facts should 
be considered in the light most favorable to him, 
and only if it clearly appears that he could not 
establish a right to recovery under the law should 
such action be taken; and any doubts which exist 
should be resolved in favor of affording him the 
privilage of a trial. (Emphasis addend). 
A careful reading of the Trial Court's MEMORANDUM 
DECISION reveals that the Court weighed disputed evidence 
which resulted in a favorable ruling for respondents. In 
W.M. Barnes Co. vs. Sohio 627 p. 2d 56,59 (Utah Supr^me 
Court, 1981, the Supreme Court held that on a motion for 
summary judgment, it is not appropriate for a court to weigh 
disputed evidence and the sole inquiry to be determined is 
whether there is a material issue of fact. 
These cases involve numerous interelated issues, 
most being or having some dependence upon other issues and 
as a result a piecemeal dismissal of many of appellants1 
issues will deprive the appellants of the opportunity both 
to present the entire case and demonstrate how the different 
aspects of each relate to one another and are dependent 
upon other issues. 
In these cases the Court failed to read all of the 
pleadings. Thus appellants1 "contentions as to the facts", 
apparently were not considered. As a result the Court ruled 
in a vacuum and clearly erred in granting respondent's 
A 
motions for summary judgment. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
LIGHT OL TMK ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANTS. 
>hile appeJ tants are aware of Lhe IIUIIKTOUS cases 
which hold that a party against whom summary judgment 
sought cdiimot rest u}K)ii its pleadings, there are some cases 
where summary judgment simply is u<U appropriate. 
Agathangelides vs. Shaw, 74 0 p. 2d 259, (Utah 1987) , t hc 
Utah Supreme Cour:, . nanimously hole, M; a case where 
plaintiff sued defendants un a promissory note and 
defendants answered, raising fa Liu re of consideration as 
an a f f i Liuat Lve defense, that summary judgment was not 
appropriate. In so holding the Com t , - pa-je 201 stated: 
v\e do not understand how Plaintiff's could be intitLed 
to judgment on a note as a matter of Jaw if factual 
issues to warrant trial existed as f^ wT^ther •-hero 
was consideration. 
in I in instant cases not only did appeilants affir-
matively raise the defense of J.ack of consideration and 
payment, but they plod counterclaims based i fraud, lack 
o r good faith dealings and breach (^f contract. Any of tllese 
theories i f established at trial , wi I 1 defeat respondents 
ciaj; - foreclose or for deficienc" L, Iqments against 
appeJ ;an fs. 
The Tri . ; c.i^<; : .IL;::;::; appe M ants1 
complaints and counterclaims. if goes without saying that 
matters pled in a counterclaim are in fact to be considered 
as defenses : >- !,<«> ' ;•! Rule ; itan nules of Civil 
Pmccnlurc . 
If appeal's that one of the undei lying p: inciples of 
tlie Agathangelides (SUJ .(, opinio l is that snmmary judgmen:. 
should not be grant od when a proper i y f oo c aim nr defons'), 
if proven a ! L I i a 1., v, . I : de tea f P la i n I. i ft 1 s : I a ; . b *• • i le 
otherwise c-:ald result In manifest injustice. Jn I hose 
cases, the ruling of the Trial Court on Respondent's mot io I 
for Summary judgment wiJ L likely rosu 1 ' ;• aepel i.r j s boh": \ 
den led I he i >* b'i <* i '' de To^^oc ,-H \ \ \ ,» \
 m 
Therefore in keeping with the Agathangelides (Supra) 
ratonale it was inappropriate for the trial court to grant 
summary judgment in these cases. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS FILED ABSTRACTS OF DEPOSITIONS, 
AFFIDAVITS, MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVITS, AND MEMORANDUMS 
IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
THEREBY ESTABLISHING GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL FACTS. 
Appellants filed numerous abstracts of depositions, 
affidavits and memorandums as well as a motion to strike 
affidavits. Further, all parties relied upon all of the 
depositions taken in these cases. All of these documents 
were filed in opposition to respondents1 motions for summary 
judgment and one is compelled to ask, are these some of the 
pleadings that the Trial Court failed to read? 
The affidavits filed by respondent in support of its 
motions for summary judgment fail to meet the requirements 
of rule 56 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, pro-
vides (in the relevant part) as follows: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made 
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein. 
The rule sets forth three requirements for such 
affidavits. 
They are: 
1. The affidavits shall be made upon affiant's 
personal knowledge. 
2. The affidavits shall set forth facts as would 
be admissible in evidence. 
3. The affidavits shall show affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein. 
id 
The affiant, Norman eaton, fails to state in his 
affidavit that he makes the affidavit upon Ins personal 
knowledge, Further, there is no showing in the affidavit 
stated. 
As to I he second criteria of rule r)6(o) there are no 
foundational facts set fort] : ,. the affidavit the] I hoic-
fore the facts set forth in the affidavit may or may nor 
be admissible in evidence. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL WADS CARTER AND LONFTA SUF CARTFR: 
Said affidavit suffers from the same sh. a dconu n- js as 
the [\ormui; . lleaton affidavit and thereto! e I ho I,,IINP 
argument is applied. 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN R. KR(H\h: 
Said affidavit fails to moot l ho ! M si, ^^a tn
 L t d 
criteria of rule 5G(e) and may aJ .so Cnd foundation and 
therefore must fai I. 
AFFIDAVITS OF DAN i\. KUBIS'' ' ! ' \ - ' ' : 1 
Novembei , '•)< 
Neithot o : iw tobis^n allid^vits sla;u .iny bo.-^ is 
whatsoever thai co i Ld enable Lire reader to ascertain Dan. 
, „ .; .son1:, connections, .if any, io t ho trustee, Securiiy 
Til le Company of Southern Utah. 11 the1: , his affidavits 
fail to state that ho is familial with the books and 1 e-
cords of the: trustee. Therefore, there is nothing in the 
affidavits to show that (1) the affidavits are made upon 
affiant's personal Fnowtodge, (2) thai Uie facts set forth 
would be admissibJe in evidence, not , i ) is there any 
showing that affiant i •• "ojnpoiont ' ' >\' ' i !"v ' -% id;o matt. :-
stated tJiere i n . 
AFFIDAVIT OF *\ .M.C. >. -'ui^'i'i^ U.IMU "ctobei r>, I '*.: 
;J(jwliero in C. Daniel Covington's Affidavit, does, he 
state 'hat h^ makes I h^ A f ! i-tr-; ' • • i s personal knowledge , 
except in paragraph 49. 
In fact, affiant repeatedly states "...it appears ..." 
(paragraphs 4, 6, 9, 12, 14, 30, 31, and 32) 
Inadmissible hearsay appears in the following para-
graphs of the Covington Affidavit: 4,6,9,12,14,18,23,25, 
26, 30, 31,32,38,40, and 50. 
Paragraphs 11,13,16, and 35 of the affidavit contain 
inadmissible conclusions. 
Statements appear in paragraphs 27 and 35 of the 
affidavit that lack sufficient foundation to be admissible. 
Paragraphs 42,43, and 41 contain assumptions that would be 
inadmissible at trial. 
However, paragraphs 47 and 4 9 of the Covington Affidavit 
bear particular and special scrutiny. The draftmanship 
of said paragraphs is remarkable for its evasion. To ill-
ustrate the skill with which those paragraphs were drawn, 
they are set out in their entirety as follows: 
47. Various extension agreements dated on or about 
October 6, 1980, (Exhibits "H" through "K|T do not re-
flect any contract or commitment by either First 
Security or Auto West regarding a takeout loan to be 
made by First Security to Auto West. Exhibits "H" 
through "K" were intended to and did merely extend 
already existing obligations owed to First Security. 
The contents of those documents reflect the agreements 
between First Security and its borrowers with respect 
to those extension agreements, (emphasis added). 
49. From documents reviewed and from his own personal 
knowledge, affiant is aware that First Security did 
make various loans, some of which had terms of five 
years or longer to Utah Land and Cattle, Jones Motor 
Company and Real West, Inc. Each one of those loans 
was a separate, independent loan transaction and was 
supported by its own collateral, paymetit schedule 
and loan history. The loan application summaries 
describe the anticipated repayment source of the 
loans. Affiant is unaware of any other payment source 
of those loans beyond the sources of payment appearing 
on the various applications. Where those applications 
do not reflect a purported long term loan to Auto West 
as a source of repayment, affiant is unaware of 
information that would indicate that a long term 
Toan to Auto West was regarded by First SecuriTy 
a repayment source or that any officer or employee 
of First Security committed First Security to long 
term Financing for Auto West, (emphasis added) 
Paragrapl 1 4 7 attempts' to ] i mil: affiant1 s ki lowlecjge to 
exhibits "II" 'hmiKih -nd allow hio lo !.>nestly sa- ... 
( ; .H * • i ICCL .-r. v;i; ( i .i,-,- >r corn-
mi tjnent by either First Security or AuLo West regajding a take 
out loai Attaohod to Mr. Covi ng 1-nn ' s affidavit , are ex-
h.ibii.... arougi. .IUJ UXJILLM loan application 
summary, dated October 6, 19^0 regarding the borrower, Jones 
Motor CoiT,T;nii". In- sols f. ' ' i^ • o • •< iii*an i 
of repayment as follows: 
Primary payable in five (".: five annua 1 in-
stallments of $11,252.30. Payments to come 
from sale of property or note will be 
completly paid out with long term financing. 
Secondary-Liquidation of Coil a tora 1 . 
Futhei , i,; the remarks section of that document tlle 
f' • I ipp<M rs : 
As per our phone conversation, we will be looking at 
some form of long term financing^ However, from what 
little I have seen, it may be very difficult to put 
together. This will leave them with the requirments 
of liquidating properties to retire the debts owed by 
the various corporations, which was the original 
method of debt retirement. At this point, there is 
nothing in the way of a sale on the horizon. In the 
immediate future, they have approximately $75,000.00 
coming due (by 12-3] -80) . (emphasis added) 
Exhibit s a FSB generated dominion! and does make 
r e 1 i.'i o n o . " . . i t ,i !. ' * 
signature. 
The underlined portion of paragraph 4°, abovo, is aii 
apparent attempt i- ignore exiiito 
/ ~7 
Paragraphs 47 and 49 are admissions that long term 
financing to Jones Motor Company, Inc., ( a subsidiary of 
AW was being considered by officers of FSB during October 
of 1980, when read carefully and in conjuction with exhibit 
"L" . 
The Heaton, Carter, Brown, Robison and Covington 
affidavits all fail to meet the requirements of rule 56(e) 
URCP and therefore should be striken from the files. 
Through the affidavits and depositions submitted by 
appellants in oppositions to, motions, for summary judg-
ment, numerous issues of material fact were raised, Spe-
cifically see the affidavits of Chas. E. Bryan and the 
deposition of Norman T. Stephens taken on December 1, 1986. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from the MEMORANDUM DECISION the Trial 
Court failed to follow the requirements of rule 56 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when it granted summary 
judgment. The Court did not consider all the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and 
affidavits in the light most favorable to the parties moved 
against, if they were, in deed, considered at all. 
Also, appellants1 pleadings affirmatively alledge 
defenses and counterclaims that render summary judgment 
inappropriate. Summary judgment in these cases has the 
effect of denying properly pled defenses to the appellants. 
IS 
Furthermore, the depositions, affidavits and other 
memoranda tiled h; opposition lo ! he motions by appellants 
raise fermine issues of material, fact, Lhereby precluding 
summary j udgmerit. 
It is respectfully submiLLed LhaL upon a review of 
t l le p l e a d i n g s and documents on t i o h e r e i n , i h i s c o u r t wii 11 
s€^ e the manifest error of" the Trial CouiL, reverse and 
remand. Lo L r La J . 
DATED this //'T"/f day of April, 1 98 9 
f 
Chas. E. Bryan, Norman Stephens, Paul D. Graff, 
Pro Se Pro Se Pro Se 
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